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Note
Revising the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines to Eliminate the Focus on Compliance
Programs and Cooperation in Determining
Corporate Sentence Mitigation
Lindsay K Eastman*
On January 14, 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder made
a promise to the American people: "When we find businesses or
individuals whose disregard for the law has hurt the pocket-
books of average Americans, we will use every available meas-
ure to hold them accountable."' After explaining to the Finan-
cial Crisis Inquiry Commission2 that fraud in the banking and
securities industries are at their highest recorded levels, Hold-
er vowed drastic action, "not just to hold accountable those
whose conduct may have contributed to the last meltdown, but
to deter such future conduct as well." 3 As these strong state-
ments indicate, it is the established goal of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to vigilantly monitor and harshly punish corpo-
rate crime.
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2007,
Gustavus Adolphus College. The author thanks Adjunct Professor Andrew
Mohring for providing the background on organizational sentencing that made
this Note possible. She also thanks the staff and editors of the Minnesota Law
Review, especially Joseph Hansen and Theresa Nagy for their thoughtful edits
and suggestions. Last, but certainly not least, the author greatly appreciates
the endless support and encouragement of her family and friends. Copyright ©
2010 by Lindsay K. Eastman.
1. Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., Statement of Attorney Gener-
al Eric H. Holder, Jr. Appearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commis-
sion (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Statement of Eric H. Holder], available at
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0114 -Holder.pdf.
2. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission is charged with examining
the causes of the recent economic collapse. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commis-
sion, http://www.fcic.gov (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). Congress created the bi-
partisan Commission when it enacted the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5, 123 Stat. 1617, 1625-31.
3. Statement of Eric H. Holder, supra note 1, at 2.
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The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines or
OSG), promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion (USSC), are focused on preventing and punishing organi-
zational crime. 4 A court must calculate the appropriate sen-
tence range using the OSG,5 which allows subtraction of points
from an organization's Guidelines sentence based on two fac-
tors: the existence of an effective compliance program at the
time of the misconduct and cooperation in the government in-
vestigation, which includes waiver of applicable privileges, ac-
ceptance of responsibility, and self-reporting of the miscon-
duct.6 As such, organizations seeking to mitigate criminal pu-
nishment can do so by adopting a facially effective compliance
and ethics program, and/or reporting illegal activity to prosecu-
tors and cooperating in the investigation.
This Note argues that the OSG should be revised to elimi-
nate sentence mitigation based on compliance programs and
cooperation in order to better advance the DOJ's objectives of
detecting and deterring corporate crime. Part I discusses orga-
nizational sentencing, including the development of the OSG
and corresponding DOJ policy statements, and the operation of
the Guidelines in practice. Part II analyzes why reducing crim-
inal punishment based on an organization's adoption of a com-
pliance program and cooperation with the authorities is ineffec-
tive at preventing and identifying corporate crime. To further
the DOJ's goal of getting tough on organizational crime, Part
4. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (2009) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES MANUAL] (explaining that the Guidelines are designed to "provide
just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives" for organizations to
police themselves). The Guidelines define an "organization" as any "person
other than an individual," including "corporations, partnerships, associations,
joint-stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organiza-
tions, governments . . . and non-profit organizations." Id. § 8Al.1 cmt. n.1 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). This Note focuses on corporations, and uses
the terms "corporations" and "organizations" interchangeably.
5. The Supreme Court has declared the mandatory application of the
Guidelines unconstitutional as violating defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 267 (2005). Still, the federal courts
must calculate the Guidelines sentence and explain any departure from the
suggested range. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007) (holding
that courts should begin sentencing proceedings by calculating the applicable
Guidelines range; then, after making an "individualized assessment based on
the facts presented," courts should ensure that any variance from the Guide-
lines sentence is justified).
6. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, § 8C2.5(f)-(g), cmt. n.12 (de-
scribing the effect of compliance programs and cooperation on the OSG score,
and defining cooperation to include "the disclosure of all pertinent information
known by the organization").
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III proposes that the USSC eliminate the sentence mitigation
provisions of the OSG, instead relying upon the general sen-
tencing policies incorporated in the Guidelines7 and allowing
judges to consider multiple criteria and exercise discretion to
fashion an appropriate punishment in the case at hand.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING
All three federal government branches influence sentenc-
ing8 : Congress defines criminal conduct and sets statutory max-
imum and minimum sentences;9 the executive, primarily
through the DOJ, exercises prosecutorial discretion to choose
whom to charge and when to plea bargain;' 0 and the judiciary
promulgates the Guidelines through the USSC and, of course,
actually imposes sentences after conviction." To fully under-
stand the revisions to the OSG, this Note proposes that it is
important to identify the roles of each branch in the sentencing
process. This Part first describes the development of the OSG,
including the Sentencing Reform Act and the deliberation that
led to the implementation of the Guidelines. Second, this Part
discusses DOJ charging and sentencing policy. Finally, it ex-
plains the operation of the Guidelines in practice, detailing the
process courts use in determining an organization's sentence.
7. Congress requires courts to consider certain factors and to craft sen-
tences that reflect congressional judgment about the purposes of sentencing,
including punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006). Organizational sentences are no exception. See id. § 3551(c). In estab-
lishing the USSC, Congress specifically instructed it to design sentencing
guidelines to effect those purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (2006).
8. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989) (explaining
that federal sentencing "never has been thought to be assigned by the Consti-
tution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three Branches of Gov-
ernment").
9. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916) (holding that
the judicial power to sentence defendants is subject to the constraints imposed
by Congress); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820)
(acknowledging the power of Congress to "ordain ... punishment" for federal
crimes).
10. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (noting that
the government has significant, though not unlimited, discretion with respect
to the decision to prosecute).
11. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2009), httpJ/www.ussc.gov/general/USSCOverview
200906.pdf (describing the USSC as "an independent agency in the judicial
branch" and acknowledging the role of federal judges in imposing sentences).
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A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES
Corporations at common law could not be convicted of
crimes.12 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Su-
preme Court first affirmed Congress's extension of criminal lia-
bility to corporations, holding that they may be held criminally
responsible for the acts of their employees. 13 In spite of this,
corporations did not commonly face criminal prosecution until
1984, when Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act that
provides the basis for contemporary sentencing practices.14 Al-
though the Reform Act focused on individual sentencing, it also
implemented an enhanced structure for corporate fines. Before
this Act, the law provided the same fines for individuals and
corporations, typically totaling only a few thousand dollars.15
Such low fines effectively allowed large corporations to ignore
criminal laws. 16 In response, Congress more than doubled the
mean fines for corporations,' 7 raising felony fines for corpora-
tions up to $500,000 per count. 18 The purposes for raising these
fines relate to the expanded goals of sentencing under the
Reform Act: the Act shifted the focus of sentencing from reha-
bilitation to also include considerations of just punishment, de-
terrence, and incapacitation.19
Perhaps most importantly, the Sentencing Reform Act
created the USSC to promulgate sentencing guidelines. 20 The
legislative history of the Act contains few explicit references to
12. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *464.
13. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 496-
97 (1909). Since this decision, the scope of corporate criminal liability has ex-
panded to the actions of all agents committed within the scope of the employ-
ment and with the intent to benefit the organization. See United States v. Au-
tomated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406-08 (4th Cir. 1985).
14. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2006)).
15. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 103-05 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3286-88 (explaining that the typical felony conviction for a
corporation could only be punishable by a fine of $5000 to $10,000).
16. See id. at 106 (reasoning that corporations could shrug off low fines as
a "cost of doing business," one which "may in fact be more than offset by the
gain from the illegal method of doing business").
17. See Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on
Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247, 257
tbl.3 (1991) (explaining that mean fines for corporations rose from $45,790
before 1984 to $102,469 after 1984).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) (2006).
19. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38, 50 (describing the rehabilitative sen-
tencing model as "outmoded" and laying out new goals for federal sentencing).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006).
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organizational sentencing, but Congress made it clear that cor-
porations were not to be exempted from sentencing reform.21 In
addition to the data suggesting that the fines imposed on or-
ganizations were doing little to deter misconduct, the Commis-
sion based its decision to proceed with the OSG on research
suggesting unwarranted sentence disparity among organiza-
tions convicted of similar offenses. 22 This disparity complicated
the USSC's mission, however, because it could not base the new
guidelines on past sentences.23 Still, the Commission gathered
data on organizational sentencing between 1984 and 1990,
which revealed the kinds of organizations sentenced, their of-
fenses, the penalties imposed, and the factors that influenced
these sentences. 24 This data provided a starting point for the
draft guidelines. 25
To complete the OSG, the USSC went through a long
process, including publishing four sets of draft guidelines for
comment and reviewing the approximately four hundred public
comments submitted, holding five public hearings, and conven-
ing expert advisory groups.26 The Commission-appointed Cor-
porate Defense Attorney Working Group developed principles
especially important to the USSC, urging the creation of a sen-
tencing system that provides incentives to reduce the occur-
rence of crime and bases punishment on the degree of culpabili-
21. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 166 ("Another area in which the Sentencing
Commission might wish to issue general policy statements concerns the impo-
sition of sentence upon organizations convicted of criminal offenses."). Thus,
Congress did not require the USSC to promulgate organizational guidelines,
but rather left the matter to the Commission's discretion. See id.
22. See Mark A. Cohen et al., Report on Sentencing of Organizations in the
Federal Courts, 1984-1987, in U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, DIScUSSION MATE-
RIALS ON ORGANIZATIONAL SANCTIONS, pt. III, at 10-11 (1988) (discussing this
sentencing disparity).
23. Congress instructed the USSC to ascertain the "average sentences
imposed" for offenses in the past, but cautioned that because of their wide-
spread failure to "accurately reflect the seriousness" of offenses, such sen-
tences would not be binding upon the Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006).
24. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON SENTENCING
GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS 2 (1991), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
corp/OrgGL83091.pdf.
25. See id. at 10 (describing analysis of past practices as "useful" in de-
termining base fine levels, multipliers, and other aspects of the Guidelines).
26. Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings,
and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 226-27 (1993).
Interestingly, in the public comments on the draft guidelines, the corporate
community argued in favor of substantial sentence mitigation based on the
implementation of compliance programs. See id. at 236.
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ty of the organization. 27 One key principle stipulated that the
OSG should tailor fines to "recognize an organization's relative
degree of culpability"28 and to "encourage desirable behavior."29
Lastly, public perception played a major role in the USSC's
formulation of the OSG because Congress required the Com-
mission to consider the "community view of the gravity of the
offense" and the "public concern generated by the offense."30
After engaging in this process, the USSC promulgated its first
iteration of the OSG in 1991, incorporating the principles
promulgated by Congress and its advisory groups. When the
OSG went into effect, the focus of organizational sentencing
shifted to emphasize corporate self-governance through effec-
tive compliance and ethics programs, as well as acceptance of
responsibility and cooperation in investigations.31
In 2004, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guide-
lines to impose stricter criteria for effective compliance pro-
grams, establishing a separate section to more fully address the
key elements that programs should incorporate. 32 To be consi-
dered effective under the revised OSG, organizational com-
pliance programs must "promote an organizational culture that
encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance
with the law."3 3 As part of its compliance program, an organiza-
tion must "exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal
conduct" and "establish standards and procedures to prevent
and detect criminal conduct." 34 Further, to receive sentence mi-
tigation, a corporation must engage in self-assessment and
regularly evaluate the risk of criminal conduct.35 The Guide-
lines thus establish a "carrot and stick" approach to compliance
programs: organizations found to have effective programs can
reduce their potential federal criminal fines up to ninety-five
27. Id. at 227.
28. Id. at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, ch. 8, introductory cmt. (explain-
ing that the purposes underlying the OSG are to provide "just punishment,
adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to maintain internal
mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct").
30. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4)-(5) (2006).
31. See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 26, at 210 (describing dramatic sen-
tence reductions available under the OSG to organizations that "demonstrate
in specified ways [their] antipathy toward lawbreaking").
32. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, § 8B2.1.
33. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2).
34. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(1), (b)(1).
35. Id. § 8B2.1(c).
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percent.36 Thus, as the Sentencing Commission explained in
the introduction to the Guidelines, the OSG are based on the
premise that compliance and ethics programs can effectively
prevent and detect organizational crime. 37
The revisions to the 2004 Guidelines, along with the pas-
sage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,38 increased the emphasis on
full cooperation in government investigations. 39 This coopera-
tion must occur before any "imminent threat" of disclosure or
investigation, and within a "reasonably prompt" time after dis-
covering the misconduct. 40 In commentary since deleted from
the Guidelines, the Commission explained that such full coop-
eration may require the corporation to waive the attorney-
client privilege and work-product protections when "necessary
in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all perti-
nent information known to the organization."41 Organizations
that cooperate in investigations may even be given a sentence
below the congressionally established statutory minimum to
reflect the organization's "substantial assistance" in the corpo-
rate investigation, or in the prosecution of another person. 42 In
contrast, a corporation deemed uncooperative in an investiga-
tion can be found complicit in the illegal activity and have its
fines multiplied by a factor of four.43 Indeed, the current ver-
sion of the OSG places more emphasis on the development of
36. Paul Fiorelli & Ann Marie Tracey, Why Comply? Organizational
Guidelines Offer a Safer Harbor in the Storm, 32 J. CORP. L. 467, 467 (2007).
37. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, ch. 8, introductory cmt.
("These guidelines offer incentives to organizations to reduce and ultimately
eliminate criminal conduct by providing a structural foundation from which an
organization may self-police its own conduct through an effective compliance
and ethics program. The prevention and detection of criminal conduct, as faci-
litated by an effective compliance and ethics program, will assist an organiza-
tion in encouraging ethical conduct and in complying fully with all applicable
laws.").
38. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 805(a)(5), 116 Stat. 745, 802 (2002) (directing
the USSC to revise the Guidelines to ensure that they "are sufficient to deter
and punish organizational criminal misconduct").
39. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, § 8C2.5 (providing a much
lower "culpability score" for corporations that fully cooperate in investigations
than for those deemed uncooperative).
40. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1). The Guidelines offer a smaller two-point reduction
"[ilf the organization fully cooperated in the investigation and clearly demon-
strated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal
conduct." Id. § 8C2.5(g)(2).
41. Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. n.12.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006).
43. Fiorelli & Tracey, supra note 36, at 467-68.
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compliance programs and cooperation with prosecutors than
ever before.
B. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SENTENCING POLICY
After the promulgation of the OSG, the DOJ issued policy
statements addressing how it planned to effectuate the Guide-
lines. The DOJ's first statement on the sentencing of corpora-
tions came in the 1999 Holder Memo, which provided eight fac-
tors for prosecutors to consider when deciding whether to
charge organizations, including any voluntary waiver of the
attorney-client and work-product protections and the existence
of an effective compliance program at the time of the miscon-
duct.44 Increased public awareness of corporate fraud prompted
the DOJ to issue the Thompson Memo in 2003, with the goal of
creating an "increased emphasis on and scrutiny of .. . a corpo-
ration's cooperation" with federal investigators in both charging
and sentencing.45 The Thompson Memo preserved the eight
Holder factors, including the waiver language, and emphasized
the need to ensure that corporate compliance measures were
not just "paper programs."46 Thus, in interpreting the OSG, the
DOJ has chosen to focus on pursuing waiver of the attorney-
client and work-product privileges as an important element in
cooperation.
Following the issuance of the Thompson Memo, the Sen-
tencing Commission in 2004 amended the OSG to emphasize
the importance of full cooperation in government investiga-
tions.47 Responding to criticism over the waiver policy estab-
lished in the 2004 amendments, the DOJ in 2006 issued the
McNulty Memo 4 8 instructing prosecutors to request attorney
work product and privileged materials only "when there is a
44. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All Com-
ponent Heads & U.S. Attorneys 3-4 (June 16, 1999), available at http://www
.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/1999junl6_privwaiv_dojholder.pdf.
45. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to
Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Attorneys, cover letter (Jan. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftflbusiness-organizations.pdf.
46. Id. at 3-4, 9-10.
47. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, § 8C2.5 (providing a much
lower culpability score for corporations that fully cooperate in investigations
than for those that do not).
48. Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty replaced the Thompson Memo
on December 12, 2006. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney
Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys, cover letter, at 2 (Dec.




legitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their
law enforcement obligations,"49 and to ask only for the "least
intrusive waiver necessary to conduct a complete and thorough
investigation."50 Currently, prosecutors are only permitted to
request certain privileged materials if the initial facts disclosed
"provide(] an incomplete basis to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion."5 1 Even though the McNulty Memo facially reduced prose-
cutors' discretion in requesting privilege waivers, many believe
it does not go far enough to protect individual and corporate
rights. As such, corporations are still encouraged to waive pri-
vileges or face being regarded as uncooperative in the investi-
gation and incurring greatly increased fines under the OSG.
C. THE GUIDELINES IN OPERATION
Judges calculating a fine under the OSG proceed in five
general steps. 52 First, the court must identify the offense level
of the crime. The Guidelines assign offense levels to each crime
based on seriousness, with level one being the least severe and
level forty-three the most.5 3 Second, the judge looks to the fine
table that correlates offense level with the proper fine. 54 Third,
the court calculates the culpability score of the organization
based on its prior history, cooperation in the investigation, ac-
ceptance of responsibility, and whether it had adopted a com-
pliance program at the time of the misconduct.55 Each organi-
zation begins with a culpability score of five, which is adjusted
downward or upward based on the presence of mitigating or
aggravating factors. The OSG mandate a five-point reduction in
the sentence calculation if the organization fully cooperates in
the government investigation and accepts responsibility for the
criminal conduct.56 The Guidelines require an additional three-
point sentence reduction if the crime occurred in spite of the
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id. at 10.
52. For a more thorough explanation of the Guidelines sentencing process,
see Paul E. McGreal, An Overview of Corporate Compliance and Ethics Pro-
grams, in ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS WORKSHOP 2009,
at 139, 142-44 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
B-1776, 2009).
53. Specific offense levels are established in Chapter Two of the Guide-
lines. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 4, ch. 2. The OSG expressly incor-
porate those offense levels. See id. § 8C2.3.
54. See id. § 8C2.4.
55. See id. § 8C2.5.
56. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1).
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existence of an effective compliance and ethics program at the
time of the misconduct.5 7 Fourth, the court identifies any fine
multipliers that correspond to the organization's culpability
score; the top multiplier range is 2.00 to 4.00 for an organiza-
tion with a high culpability score, and the lowest range is 0.05
to 0.20 if the culpability score is low.5 8 Fifth, and last, the judge
must set the actual fine within the established range, consider-
ing factors such as the seriousness of the offense, the organiza-
tion's role in the offense, any nonpecuniary loss caused to oth-
ers, and the gain to the organization from the offense.59
Additionally, federal sentencing law indicates that judges
should consider general sentencing policy and goals along with
the Guidelines range.60 The pertinent sentencing policy is out-
lined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), in which Congress establishes sev-
eral factors (the § 3553(a) factors) for courts to consider in sen-
tencing.6 1 The § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circums-
tances of the offense; history and characteristics of the defen-
dant; seriousness of the offense; and the need to promote re-
spect for the law, provide just punishment, and afford adequate
deterrence to future criminal conduct. 62 Historically, the
§ 3553(a) factors were used sparingly in sentencing. After the
Supreme Court made the guidelines nonmandatory in 2005,63
however, courts began to look to the § 3553(a) factors when
sentencing organizations, especially when deciding what sen-
tence to impose within the calculated Guidelines range.64
The rest of this Note demonstrates that the OSG sentence-
mitigation factors are ineffective at deterring and detecting
corporate crime, and suggests a proposal for reform. The next
Part discusses the evidence showing that the focus on com-
57. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1) ("If the offense occurred even though the organization
had in place at the time of the offense an effective compliance and ethics pro-
gram, as provided in § 8B2.1 (Effective Compliance and Ethics Program), sub-
tract 3 points."). The Manual withholds mitigation in situations when "after
becoming aware of an offense, the organization unreasonably delayed report-
ing the offense to appropriate governmental authorities." Id. § 8C2.5(f)(2).
58. See id. § 802.6.
59. See id. § 8C2.8.
60. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 224 (2005) (explaining that
federal sentencing law "requires judges to take account of the Guidelines to-
gether with other sentencing goals").
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7) (2006).
62. Id. § 3553(a)(1)-(2).
63. Booker, 543 U.S. at 267.
64. See Timothy A. Johnson, Note, Sentencing Organizations After Book-
er, 116 YALE L.J. 632, 642 (2006).
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pliance and cooperation is misplaced. Part III then details revi-
sions to the OSG, including eliminating sentence mitigation
based on compliance and cooperation.
II. THE MISPLACED FOCUS ON COMPLIANCE AND
COOPERATION
The mandatory sentence reduction based on compliance
programs and cooperation with the prosecution is unwarranted
because the available evidence shows that these efforts do not
actually increase deterrence or detection of corporate crime.
Indeed, incorporating these mitigating factors into the OSG
actually undermines the rights of organizations and their em-
ployees.
A. COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS
Although many organizations have adopted compliance
programs in hopes of receiving sentence mitigation under the
OSG, 65 evidence suggesting that these programs are actually
successful at preventing and detecting crime within corpora-
tions is scarce.66 Several possible reasons exist for this ineffec-
tiveness.
Organizations have incentives to adopt "window-dressing"
compliance programs that facially meet the OSG requirements
but are substantively ineffective.67 Supporting a compliance
program that meets all the various requirements of the OSG is
very costly, and can place a large financial burden on a corpora-
tion.6 8 The programs are very expensive both to create and
maintain, and companies seeking sentencing mitigation are
65. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Pa-
radox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1383-84 (1999).
66. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the
Principal-Agent Model, 32 FIA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 591-97 (2004); cf. Gilbert
Geis & Joseph F.C. DiMento, Empirical Evidence and the Legal Doctrine of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 341, 361-63 (2002) (noting
that there is no proof that corporate criminal liability serves a deterrent ef-
fect); Marc S. Raspanti & Gregg W. Mackuse, What's Really So Important
About an Effective Compliance Program?, CHAMPION, May 2007, at 22, 23 (in-
dicating that many sentenced organizations had in place robust compliance
programs).
67. For examples of "window-dressing" compliance programs, see Kimber-
ly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance,
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003).
68. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Drifting Down the Dnieper with Prince Potem-
kin: Some Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in
Federal Criminal Sentencing, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 680 (2004).
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also required to comply with onerous evidentiary documenta-
tion requirements to prove the effectiveness of their pro-
grams.6 9 The technology required to compile the necessary data
for reporting to government agencies alone can be very expen-
sive, as can the maintenance of a compliance officer at the
management level. 70 Due to the large number of resources that
must be dedicated to compliance program development in order
for it to be successful, coerced implementation of compliance
programs can be especially difficult for small corporations.71
The immense financial and other demands of compliance pro-
grams offer further disincentives for corporations to develop
these programs.
Furthermore, as the specific elements of compliance pro-
grams are prescribed by the government, there is a likelihood
that the program will not be adequately tailored to the needs of
the organization. 72 When an organization designs its programs
to fit legal requirements rather its unique needs, the organiza-
tion suffers from inefficient allocation of resources and is put at
a competitive disadvantage. 73 By establishing minimum re-
69. These onerous burdens manifest in a number of areas of regulation
and other contexts. See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corpo-
rate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver
Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 942 (2006) (discussing burdens associated
with corporate attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine); Donald C.
Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate
Law's "Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems," 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 959
(2006) (noting the general costs associated with documenting compliance).
70. See Paul E. Fiorelli, Fine Reductions Through Effective Ethics Pro-
grams, 56 ALB. L. REV. 403, 410 (1992).
71. See Paul E. McGreal, Legal Risk Assessment After the Amended Sen-
tencing Guidelines: The Challenge for Small Organizations, 23 CORP. COUNS.
REV. 153, 196-98 (2004) (discussing the unique challenges faced by small or-
ganizations when designing compliance programs).
72. See Jean K. FitzSimon & Paul McGreal, Corporate Compliance Sur-
vey, 60 Bus. LAW. 1759, 1761 (2005); Richard S. Gruner, A Compendium of
Compliance Program Standards: Statutory, Regulatory, Judicial, and Private
Sources, in 1 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSTITUTE 2004, at 641, 683 (PLI Cor-
porate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1417, 2004); cf. Kra-
wiec, supra note 67, at 518 (highlighting inadequate tailoring as applied to
employment discrimination policies). But see Fiorelli, supra note 70, at 409
(noting that the "Guidelines' fine scheme takes into account a company's size"
in an attempt to better account for higher caliber managers in large organiza-
tions).
73. Cf. Langevoort, supra note 69, at 960-64 (noting that high-quality
compliance programs are costly, and thus provide less benefit to the share-
holder than pure market-based mechanisms for curtailing fraud). But see
Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Byrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a De-
fense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L.
REV. 605, 674-75 (1995).
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quirements for compliance programs, the Guidelines encourage
corporations to establish compliance programs that meet these
obligations, but nothing more.74 The requirements of the law
can become counterproductive if companies get so caught up in
complying with the letter of the law that they forget to consider
the spirit of the law, which is designed to encourage corpora-
tions to develop programs that not only conform to legal re-
quirements, but also foster a spirit of true compliance and eth-
ics within the organization.75 The bottom line is that the check-
list approach used in the OSG is unlikely to encourage the de-
velopment of effective compliance programs.76
Further, the specific elements of effective compliance and
ethics programs outlined in the OSG may not result in the de-
velopment of the best compliance programs in all circums-
tances. 77 For example, the Guidelines ignore the concepts of
shared corporate values and an organizational tone of com-
pliance, 78 which have been found to be integral in the effective-
ness of compliance programs.79 Empirical data suggest that
values-based compliance programs are more effective in deter-
ring criminal conduct than the currently emphasized com-
pliance-based programs.80 Furthermore, the OSG elements are
74. Cf. Jeffrey L. Seglin, Will More Rules Yield Better Corporate Beha-
vior?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, § 3 (Sunday Edition), at 4 (noting that with
new regulations imposed on businesses, they will likely adhere to the letter of
the law, but then try to find ways to get around it).
75. See Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments En-
courage a New Ethical Culture Within Organizations?, 39 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 565, 573 (2004); Seglin, supra note 74.
76. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 71, 114.
77. See Linda Klebc Trevino et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Com-
pliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 138-39 (1999).
78. Cf. Krawiec, supra note 66, at 599 (noting that the current legal sys-
tem ignores these kinds of qualities in general).
79. See Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and Corpo-
rate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guide-
lines, 37 J. Bus. ETHICS 367, 372 (2002); Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron
Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55
FLA. L. REV. 937, 966 (2003); Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational
Integrity, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 111; Trevino et al., supra
note 77, at 143.
80. Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organiza-
tions: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 716
(2002); Trevino et al., supra note 77, at 135 (explaining that a compliance-
based approach focuses on "preventing, detecting, and punishing violations of
the law," whereas the more effective values-based approach counsels organiza-




vague as to the exact requirements for effective compliance
programs, creating possible room for exploitation by opportu-
nistic organizations.8 1
It is also difficult for organizations to implement com-
pliance programs that will satisfy all the federal laws requiring
such programs. 82 The Guidelines represent only the judicial
branch's policy on compliance programs, and do not guarantee
compliance with specific laws in other areas.83 Because organi-
zations are being pulled in many different directions when it
comes to compliance, they are likely to get bogged down in the
various government guidance and lose focus on implementing a
program that will truly help the organization comply with the
law and detect any misconduct.
The fact that any fraud discovered by a compliance pro-
gram may be used against the organization in criminal and civ-
il proceedings is another disincentive for corporations to vigo-
rously investigate and report violations.84 Indeed, the Advisory
Group on the OSG cited this problem as one of the primary dis-
incentives for corporations to institute effective compliance
programs.85 This fact highlights another practical problem of
the Guidelines: an organization found to have an ineffective
compliance program can be subject to greater liability than one
with no program at all. 86 The organization's increased risk of
liability as a result of its own compliance program logically
leads a corporation to either choose not to implement a pro-
gram at all, or to only establish a compliance program to the
extent that it meets the minimum legal requirements.87
81. Cf. Krawiec, supra note 66, at 592-93.
82. For a list of all federal corporate compliance requirements, see Fitz-
Simon & McGreal, supra note 72, at 1767-71; Gruner, supra note 72, at 644-
82.
83. See Gruner, supra note 72, at 643-44.
84. See Fiorelli, supra note 70, at 419; Krawiec, supra note 66, at 576. But
see Amitai Aviram, In Defense of Imperfect Compliance Programs, 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 763, 769-72 (2005) (noting that an effective compliance program,
combined with nonlegal sanctions, provides an incentive for corporations to
investigate and report malfeasance).
85. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc ADVISORY GROUP
ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 108 (2003), http://www
.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/AG FINAL.pdf.
86. Cf. id. (stating that a corporation's compliance program generates
evidence against the corporation for use by future adversaries).
87. See Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 1, 14-15 (2008).
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Furthermore, organizations are not guaranteed sentencing
mitigation for implementing a compliance program. 88 The Sen-
tencing Commission reported that from 1993-2005, of the nine-
teen organizations sentenced with compliance programs, only
three received sentence mitigation.89 Because compliance pro-
grams do not guarantee sentence mitigation,90 corporations are
further discouraged from implementing truly effective pro-
grams.91
Doubt also exists as to whether prosecutors and courts are
well equipped to decide whether or not a compliance program is
legally effective. 92 The ultimate sentencing decision is made by
a federal judge, who must consider the factors enumerated in
the Guidelines to decide what mitigating factors, if any, to ap-
ply to the defendant's sentence. 93 Federal judges usually are
not in a position to effectively evaluate the success of com-
pliance programs.94 Additionally, organizations that reach the
sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding have a difficult time
answering the key question: if the corporation had an effective
compliance program, why did the program fail to prevent the
crime for which the corporation was just convicted?95 This is
88. Phillip Urofsky, Prosecuting Corporations: The Federal Principles and
Corporate Compliance Programs, U.S. ATTYS BULL., Mar. 2002, at 19, 24.
89. Kristen K. McGuffey & Thomas C. Soldan, Right-Sizing: Customizing
Compliance to the Small Corporation, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS
INSTITUTE 2008, at 97, 102-03 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Hand-
book Series No. B-1661, 2008).
90. See Cindy R. Alexander et al., The Effect of Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines on Penalties for Public Corporations, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 20, 21-23
(1999) (indicating that Guidelines-constrained corporations, on average, expe-
rienced higher total sanctions than before the Guidelines were implemented).
91. Cf. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corpo-
rations Be Held Criminally Liable?, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1270 (2000)
(noting that organizations do not necessarily have incentives to adopt "optimal
reporting measures").
92. Id. at 1271-72 (arguing that the accurate determination of an "effec-
tive" compliance program is too specialized for federal judges and prosecutors
to accomplish consistently).
93. See id.
94. See id.; Krawiec, supra note 66, at 593-95 (explaining that determin-
ing the effectiveness of a compliance program is difficult because "the indica-
tors of an effective internal compliance structure are easily mimicked, and the
true level of effectiveness is difficult for any decisionmaker lacking perfect
information to determine"). For an example of how to remedy this deficiency,
see V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1479 (1996) (describing how to avoid costs of subop-
timal corporate criminal prosecution by having the same judge hear both the
case against the accused individual and the case against the corporation).
95. See Urofsky, supra note 88, at 24.
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the inherent problem with all corporate self-regulation: by the
time the government gets involved with the internal com-
pliance structure, the program has already failed to prevent
misconduct. 96 These problems make it likely that any sentence
mitigation will be applied inconsistently, and perhaps not ap-
plied at all to organizations with truly effective compliance pro-
grams.97 Furthermore, it may not be long before public outrage
builds over the sentence reductions given to companies that
attempt self-regulation but obviously fail, or else they would
not be facing criminal liability.98 This lack of oversight on the
part of the government will only cause problems for organiza-
tions and the government, which is already seen by the public
as being too lax on corporate crime.99
Although the focus on compliance programs has increased
due to societal pressure on the government and companies to
crack down on corporate crime, the current scheme of self-
regulation is unlikely to earn many points in the public's opi-
nion. Recent corporate scandal has increased the public's wari-
ness of organizational misconduct,100 and the continued empha-
sis on self-implemented compliance programs is not going to fix
this problem. The public sees efforts of corporate self-regulation
as ineffective and disingenuous, and questions why the gov-
ernment is allowing federal money to be spent based on the cer-
tifications of corporations. 101 Because much of an organization's
success depends on its public image, and self-regulation has
been shown to increase the public mistrust in an industry, the
current emphasis on compliance programs may be bad for
business. 102
Studies show that the public mistrust of corporate self-
policing is prudent; evidence demonstrates that compliance
programs do little to prevent organizational crime. The author
of one study of compliance-program effectiveness opined that
companies' efforts to develop these programs are frustrated by
96. Id.
97. See Krawiec, supra note 66, at 582.
98. Aviram, supra note 84, at 770.
99. See id. at 773 ("Evidentiary privileges do not assuage the public's sus-
picion of misconduct; they may agitate it.").
100. See Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., Statement of Paul J.
McNulty Appearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary Concerning "The
Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Inves-
tigations" (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Statement of Paul J. McNulty), availa-
ble at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=2054&wit-id=2742.
101. See Aviram, supra note 84, at 777.
102. Id. at 773, 777.
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the lack of clarity in the OSG program criteria.103 Two addi-
tional studies found positive correlations between organiza-
tional compliance programs and legal violations.104 The authors
attributed this correlation to the "possibility that internal com-
pliance structures, such as those recommended by the [Guide-
lines], may serve primarily a window-dressing function de-
signed only to reduce legal liability." 05 Additionally, the recent
shift of the Guidelines to incorporate a focus on ethics is unlike-
ly to improve the effectiveness of these programs because nu-
merous studies show that ethics programs are similarly ineffec-
tive.106 Other evidence demonstrates no significant relationship
exists between ethics codes and the conduct of employees at
any level of the organizations.107
Even the Sentencing Commission Advisory Group concedes
that it knows of no empirical evidence showing that the Guide-
lines have caused organizations to implement effective com-
pliance programs.108 Additional anecdotal evidence from gov-
ernment officials and corporate investigators involved in prose-
cuting organizational fraud cases also supports a conclusion
that compliance programs as established in the OSG do not ac-
tually reduce corporate misconduct.109 Perhaps the most noto-
103. Lori S. Richardson Pelliccioni, New Evidence in the World of Litigating
Health Care Compliance Cases: The Compliance Effectiveness Study, 3 SEDO-
NA CONF. J. 175, 175 (2002).
104. M. Cash Mathews, Codes of Ethics: Organizational Behavior and Mis-
behavior, in 9 RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY
107, 125-26 (William C. Frederick & Lee E. Preston eds., 1987); McKendall et
al., supra note 79, at 380.
105. Krawiec, supra note 66, at 593.
106. See Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering and
Enforcing Corporate Ethical Codes, 15 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 21, 22 (1996);
Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the Mid 1990's: An Empir-
ical Study of the Fortune 1000, 18 J. BUS. ETHICS 283, 293 (1999).
107. See, e.g., Joseph L. Bardaracco & Allen P. Webb, Business Ethics: A
View from the Trenches, 37 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 14-15 (1995); Margaret Anne
Cleek & Sherry Lynn Leonard, Can Corporate Codes of Ethics Influence Beha-
vior?, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 619, 619, 627-28 (1998).
108. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 85, at 35 (2003) ("It has
been difficult to empirically test whether the organizational sentencing guide-
lines' success in raising corporate America's consciousness about compliance
programs has translated into the actual prevention or deterrence of organiza-
tional crime, however, and the Advisory Group is not aware of any empirical
evidence that the widespread movement to adopt compliance programs has
resulted in the institution of effective compliance programs.').
109. See Stephen Andersen, Hidden Troubles: Despite More Rigorous Com-
pliance Programs, Corporate Fraud Still Thrives, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Apr.
2004, at 40, 40-42 (describing the insufficiencies of compliance programs as
noted by corporate and government investigators).
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rious example of a failed compliance program is the one in
place at the time of the Enron collapse, which fully incorpo-
rated the Guidelines recommendations.110 The Enron com-
pliance program failed when the CEO ignored red flags regard-
ing improper, related-party transactions.11' The Enron scandal
highlights the problems of allowing organizations to self-police
and is an example of a corporation adopting a "window-
dressing" program with no effectiveness in actually preventing
misconduct.112
Because corporate compliance problems under the OSG are
burdensome and ineffective, the emphasis placed on these pro-
grams does not serve the Guidelines' goals of preventing and
detecting corporate crimes. The next section addresses another
problem with the OSG approach, specifically showing that of-
fering charge and sentence consideration in exchange for coop-
eration with government investigations has the potential to
breach corporate and individual rights.
B. DISCLOSURE AND COOPERATION
The policy of offering sentence mitigation to encourage co-
operation derogates the rights of corporations and their em-
ployees, and does not promote the OSG goals of preventing and
deterring organizational crime. This section discusses the
harms that befall companies and individuals as a result of this
cooperation policy.
1. Cooperation Harms the Organization
The DOJ and USSC policy of encouraging cooperation is
damaging to organizations in many ways.113 The most proble-
matic aspect of this policy is that cooperation often involves a
full waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product
110. Stuart Gilman, President of the Ethics Res. Ctr., Public Hearing Held
by the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 60
(Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ph102/plenaryl.pdf.
111. See Note, The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics:
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116
HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2130 (2003).
112. Id. at 2129-30.
113. See Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's
Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why it Is Mis-
guided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 544-45 (2003). See generally Jennifer Arlen &
Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corpo-
rate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 690-91, 745-52 (1997) (describ-
ing the shortcomings of the DOJ corporate liability policy).
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protections. 114 As the Supreme Court explained in Upjohn Co.
v. United States, impairing the attorney-client privilege and
work-product protections will "not only make it difficult for cor-
porate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is
faced with a specific legal problem but also threaten to limit the
valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their clients'
compliance with the law."115 In considering the corporate waiv-
er of privilege as a factor in evaluating cooperation, the gov-
ernment drives a wedge between corporations and their em-
ployees, which can harm both parties. 116
For example, the waiver policy incentivizes corporations to
disclose the details of conversations between employees and
company lawyers, and thus forces corporations to choose be-
tween betraying the confidences of employees and facing en-
hanced punishment from failure to fully cooperate. 117 The con-
sideration of waiver as an element of cooperation negatively
affects internal investigations because corporate counsel must
explain that they are lawyers for the corporation, not the indi-
vidual employees, and that the corporation could choose to
waive the privilege. 118 Because employees who know that their
statements could be disclosed to the government are less likely
to speak candidly with corporate counsel, the waiver policy ac-
tually defeats the Guidelines' objective of encouraging internal
reporting of corporate misconduct and undermines corpora-
tions' internal compliance initiatives.119 The Guidelines thus
chill the ability of lawyers to advise corporate clients, who fear
that communications might be turned over to the prosecu-
tion.120
114. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 347-52 (2007); Breckinridge L.
Willcox, Attorney/Client Privilege Waiver: Wrongheaded Practice?, 6 BUS.
CRIMES BULL., Jan. 2000, at 1, 1.
115. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
116. See N. Richard Janis, Deputizing Company Counsel as Agents of the
Federal Government: How Our Adversary System of Justice Is Being Destroyed,
WASH. LAW., Mar. 2005, at 32, 34.
117. Id. at 34-36, 44.
118. Id. at 35-36.
119. See id.; Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Melissa M. Longo, 'Waive' Goodbye to
Attorney-Client Privilege, 7 BUS. CRIMES BULL., Oct. 2000, at 1, 4 ("[The
DOJ's policy ... serves to discourage the acquisition of legal advice by corpora-
tions in the first place. Indeed, it may well result in less written legal ad-
vice."); David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New
World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 147, 156-57 (2000).
120. Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 119, at 149.
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The Guidelines' requirement that the cooperation be timely
further diminishes the ability of corporate counsel to give ad-
vice. 121 Because the decision to cooperate must be made
promptly upon discovery of the criminal conduct, all the facts
may not be known at the time of the decision, which deprives
the corporation of the opportunity to weigh the risks and bene-
fits associated with any waiver. 122 Furthermore, waiving the
privilege may expose the corporation to civil liability as third
parties are able to obtain any privileged disclosures. 123 Courts
generally do not recognize the validity of selective waivers, and
once formerly privileged information is disclosed it is consi-
dered to be part of the public domain, as is any information re-
lated to the subject matter of the waived material. 124
Although the DOJ contends that corporations are only re-
quested to waive privilege when necessary, a recent surge in
such waiver requests is well-documented.125 A survey per-
formed by the Association of Corporate Counsel found that
nearly seventy-five percent of both inside and outside counsel
responded that, in their experience, government agencies ex-
pect a corporation to waive legal privileges during investiga-
tions. 126 Of the respondents who confirmed that they or their
clients had been subject to investigation in the past five years,
approximately thirty percent of in-house counsel and fifty-one
percent of outside counsel said that the government expected
waiver in order to engage in bargaining or for the corporation
to be eligible for more lenient treatment.127 Of the over 675 res-
ponses to the survey, almost half of general counsel expe-
rienced some kind of privilege erosion caused by sentencing pol-
icy.128 These results show that waiver requests are becoming
121. Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Fed-
eral Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 122-23 (2003).
122. Id. at 112-14; see also Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal In-
vestigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 323 (2003).
123. Finder, supra note 121, at 114-20; see also Jed S. Rakoff, Coerced
Waiver of Corporate Privilege, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1995, at 3, 33.
124. See Finder, supra note 121, at 123-24.
125. See Tamara Loomis, Privilege Waivers: Prosecutors Step Up Use of
Bargaining Chips, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 7, 2000, at 5, 8; Steve Seidenberg & Tama-
ra Loomis, DOJ Gets Tougher on Corporations, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 2003, at
A13, A15.
126. AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT: SURVEY RESULTS 3 (2005),
http://www2.acc.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 4.
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increasingly prevalent, which is making the waiver of privilege
almost a matter of routine in government investigations.
Important lawyer advocacy groups including the American
Bar Association and Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client
Privilege decry the DOJ waiver policy. These organizations con-
tend that the policy compels organizations to waive the attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product protections, undermines
internal compliance programs, and pressures corporations to
unfairly punish employees during government investigation. 129
In addition to lawyer groups, some former DOJ officials simi-
larly support overturning the Thompson Memo policy because
it unfairly impacts individuals and tends to reward corpora-
tions that punish employees for asserting their constitutional
rights.130 For example, Andrew Weissmann, the former Direc-
tor of the DOJ Enron Task Force, admits that the Guidelines do
not do enough to protect the attorney-client privilege, which
negatively impacts organizations and their associates.131 Fur-
thermore, Weissmann contends that a lack of supervision over
individual prosecutors exacerbates the negative effects of the
current policy, especially because many prosecutors lack exper-
tise in corporate matters. 132 As such, the DOJ's most recent
statement of its wavier policy allows prosecutors to request pri-
vilege waivers with a relatively low showing of need and little
oversight. For these reasons, allowing the government to coerce
cooperation endangers organizational rights, and the next sec-
tion shows how these practices also jeopardize the rights of in-
dividual employees.
129. See Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Resolution
Adopted by the House of Delegates (Aug. 7-8, 2006), http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hodlemprights recommendation-adopted.pdf
(opposing federal corporate cooperation policies as established in the McNulty
Memo); R. WILLIAM IDE, III, AM. BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE, REPORT (Aug. 2006), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/
materials/hodlemprights-report-adopted.pdf.
130. See, e.g., Letter from Former Senior DOJ Officials to Hon. Alberto
Gonzales, Attorney Gen. (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2006sepO5_privwaiv_ frmrdojltr.pdf.
131. Examining Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the At-
torney-Client Privilege Under the McNulty Memorandum: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 134-35 (2007) (statement of Andrew
Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block LLP).
132. Id. at 130-31.
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2. Cooperation Compromises Employee Rights
The Guidelines' consideration of corporate cooperation in
charging and sentencing decisions also threatens the rights of
employees. The McNulty Memo directs prosecutors to consider
"the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for
the corporation's malfeasance" in making charging decisions,
and so encourages the government to pursue individual crimi-
nal convictions.133 The Memo also instructs prosecutors to pro-
ceed against individual defendants even when corporate prose-
cution is deferred or when a guilty plea is entered for the enti-
ty.1 34 The McNulty Memo states that a corporation's coopera-
tion in selecting targets of employee prosecution is critical be-
cause prosecutors face various obstacles when attempting to
determine individuals responsible for the corporate misconduct,
including shared lines of authority within the corporation; dis-
persed records and personnel; and the intervening promotion,
transfer, or termination of culpable or knowledgeable em-
ployees.135 Thus, the DOJ policy asks companies not only to
raise the alarm when misconduct occurs, but also to assist in
identifying and prosecuting individual employees. 36
Additionally, in attempting to cooperate with the govern-
ment, corporations often deny legal fee advances to employees
facing prosecution and refuse to share information or enter into
joint defense agreements with defendant employees. 13 7 Corpo-
rations are expected not only to withdraw financial support
from suspected employees, but also report the documents that
employees request for use in their defenses, thus revealing in-
dividual defense strategies to prosecutors.138 Employees also
are often deprived of the ability to communicate confidentially
with their employers and so are denied an important method of
133. McNulty Memo, supra note 48, at 4.
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id. at 7.
136. Cf. Brown, supra note 69, at 937-41 (discussing the barriers to em-
ployees engaging in candid communication with corporate attorneys).
137. See Lawton P. Cummings, The Ethical Mine Field: Corporate Internal
Investigations and Individual Assertions of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 109
W. VA. L. REV. 669, 674-77 (2007) (explaining the problems individual em-
ployees face when the corporation waives attorney-client privilege, including
the exposure of potentially incriminating statements); Sarah Helene Duggin,
The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporate Cooperation:
Individual Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 345 (2008).
138. See Duggin, supra note 137, at 400-02 (discussing the negative effects




gathering information that could be critical to formulating the
defense. 139
Employee rights may also be compromised during the
course of internal compliance investigations, which are often
conducted by corporate counsel.140 In using the employer's pow-
er to coerce individual employees into cooperating with the in-
vestigation, the government circumvents employees' Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.141 Although
an employee questioned by the government directly has a right
to claim the Fifth Amendment, the same privilege does not ex-
ist during a corporate internal investigation, even though the
DOJ's cooperation policy makes it likely that the conversations
will be disclosed to the government eventually.142 Furthermore,
employees do not always receive fair warning of the extent to
which the corporation's interests diverge from their own.143
When employees are questioned, they are generally offered the
classic Upjohn warnings that advise them that corporate coun-
sel represents the corporation, but are not directly informed
that any statements made during the internal investigation
may be turned over to the government if the corporation so
chooses.144 If an employee refuses to cooperate in an internal
investigation, he may be terminated and face a cloud of suspi-
cion surrounding the alleged wrongdoing.145 Employees may
also be encouraged to point the finger at coworkers in order to
avoid blame, which may cause disloyalty within the corpora-
tion.146 Using scapegoats to avoid responsibility is a time-
honored practice, and the current sentencing policy does not
139. Id. at 394-99.
140. Inna Dexter, Note, Regulating the Regulators: The Need for More
Guidelines on Prosecutorial Conduct in Corporate Investigations, 20 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 515, 526 (2007) ("[I]ncreased focus on cooperation and individ-
ual accountability creates the potential for coercion and violation of individual
rights, as the resources of the companies and the prosecutors greatly outweigh
the resources available to individual employees.").
141. Duggin, supra note 137, at 346.
142. See Andrew Longstreth, Double Agent, AM. LAW., Feb. 2005, at 68, 72-
73.
143. See generally Colin Marks, Thompson/McNulty Memo Internal Inves-
tigations: Ethical Concerns of the 'Deputized" Counsel, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1065, 1065-66 (2007) (discussing ethical concerns for attorneys performing
internal investigations).
144. See Longstreth, supra note 142, at 70-71.
145. See Marks, supra note 143, at 1092-93.
146. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the
Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 652 (2002).
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guarantee that the most culpable employees will be punished
for corporate crime. 147
Giving prosecutors access to employee statements made
during internal investigations is further problematic because it
is often these statements, rather than the alleged underlying
misconduct, that form the basis for individual criminal liabili-
ty. 148 An employee fearing prosecution may display evasive be-
havior that can be charged as obstructing justice, even though
that employee may have been innocent of any wrongdoing prior
to questioning. Relatedly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act heightens
the vulnerability of individual employees. 149 Provisions of the
Act expand the definition of obstruction, enhance potential pe-
nalties for individual criminal misconduct, and require that
executives of public companies personally certify financial
statements filed with the SEC. 150 By strengthening the en-
forcement power of prosecutors and adding charging options for
obstruction, Sarbanes-Oxley "increases the exposure of corpo-
rate managers and directors to criminal sanctions."15'
Although the use of sentence mitigation to reward corpo-
rate cooperation is harmful in many regards, the Sentencing
Commission and Justice Department still support the policy. 15 2
Prosecutors justify corporate-cooperation demands as a means
of leveraging limited government resources to hold rich and
powerful organizations accountable.153 Former Deputy Attorney
General McNulty asserted that cooperation incentives are es-
sential tools in holding corporate wrongdoers accountable, and
that the policies provide "an effective balance between the in-
terests of the business community and the investing public."154
McNulty emphasized the voluntary nature of the waiver, and
asserted that "privilege waiver is often volunteered or agreed to
by a company for specific, business reasons," in order to expe-
147. Id. at 659-60.
148. See id. at 651-57.
149. See Robert A. Del Giorno, Corporate Counsel as Government's Agent:
The Holder Memorandum and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, CHAMPION, Aug.
2003, at 22, 24.
150. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 777,
802, 804-06 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.).
151. Moohr, supra note 79, at 953.
152. See John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior-The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Experiment Begins To Bear Fruit, in 1 CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE 2002, at 113, 124 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Hand-
book Series No. B-1317, 2002).
153. Duggin, supra note 137, at 345.
154. Statement of Paul J. McNulty, supra note 100, at 2.
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dite the resolution of an investigation.15 5 Even though the DOJ
continues to defend its waiver policy, the evidence shows that
coercing organizations into cooperating with government inves-
tigations imperils the rights of corporations and their em-
ployees at all levels, and is ineffective at preventing organiza-
tional crime.
The increasing prevalence of corporate fraud has caused
the DOJ to step up its efforts in investigating organizational
misconduct. The OSG provide for corporate sentence mitigation
if the organization cooperates with government investigators
and has in place an effective compliance and ethics program at
the time of the alleged misconduct. As shown in this Part, offer-
ing sentence mitigation based on these factors has the potential
to endanger the rights of both corporations and employees, and
fails to further the goals of detecting and preventing corporate
crime. The next Part suggests a strategy for reform that would
better advance sentencing goals and addresses the potential
criticisms of this proposal.
III. REVISING THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
In light of the compelling evidence that the OSG mitigation
provisions do little to deter or detect organizational crime, the
Guidelines should be revised to eliminate sentence reduction
based on compliance programs and cooperation. Under this re-
vised framework, the mandatory reduction in the culpability
score based on these factors would be abolished. Rather,
whether sentence reduction is warranted based on a particular
organization's compliance program or cooperation with the in-
vestigation should be weighed within the current Guidelines
framework that allows judges to consider multiple factors when
fashioning a sentence.156
Under this proposed revision, judges would still calculate
the Guidelines range, but would omit the point reductions cur-
rently mandated for compliance programs and cooperation.
Still, this does not mean that judges could not take into account
these factors if actually warranted. After calculating the Guide-
lines range, the Supreme Court has explained that trial judges
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005) (hold-
ing that judges cannot be mandated to issue sentences within the Guidelines,
but that trial courts must apply the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
to determine the proper sentence).
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must tailor a defendant's sentence in light of the § 3553(a) fac-
tors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, and
the history and characteristics of the defendant. 57 Thus, in
each case, a judge must consider specific facts to determine the
appropriate and just sentence for the defendant.15 8 Rather than
providing separate mitigating conditions for organizational
criminals and requiring judges to reduce sentences based on
these factors, the USSC should advise trial judges to instead
consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors, which may include
compliance programs and cooperation, to determine the proper
sentence adjustment.159
This framework is preferable because it allows for a case-
specific determination of punishment by the trial court, which
has an institutional advantage over appellate courts and ad-
ministrative agencies in deciding the proper sentence.o60 The
legal principle that trial judges are in the best position to hand
down just sentences rests upon their primary exposure to the
evidence, witnesses, and facts.' 6 ' If a judge decides that a
Guidelines departure is warranted after making an individua-
lized assessment based on the facts presented, the judge must
"consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justi-
fication is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the
157. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006); Booker, 543 U.S. at 249.
158. Judges may choose to deviate from the Guidelines based on many fac-
tors and the Supreme Court has recently begun to grant trial courts greater
discretion to choose when to depart. See, e.g., Spears v. United States, 129 S.
Ct. 840, 842 (2009) (upholding that the trial judge's decision to grant a signifi-
cant downward departure "based solely on its view that the 100-to-1 ratio em-
bodied in the sentencing guidelines for the treatment of crack cocaine versus
powder cocaine creates 'an unwarranted disparity within the meaning of"' the
statutory sentencing factors and was at odds with those factors (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Spears, 533 F.3d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., dissent-
ing))).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
160. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 81 (1996) (establishing the
standard of review for departure from the Guidelines to be abuse of discre-
tion).
161. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) ('The sentencing judge is
in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in
the individual case. The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility
determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not con-
veyed by the record." (quoting Brief for Federal Public and Community De-
fenders et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (No. 06-7949))); see also Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 357-58 (2007) ("The sentencing judge has access to, and greater fa-
miliarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him
than the Commission or the appeals court.").
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variance," 162 explaining the reasons that an unusually lenient
sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient jus-
tifications.163 Through this process, as opposed to the consider-
ation of rigid factors such as compliance programs and coopera-
tion, judges would be able to issue a just sentence to the defen-
dant that achieves the Guidelines' goals of deterring, detecting,
and justly punishing organizational crime.
In eliminating the sentence mitigation provisions and the
corresponding mandatory culpability score reduction for orga-
nizational criminals, the USSC would make it more difficult for
corporate defendants to escape harsh punishment unless such
leniency is truly justified. Although eliminating the automatic
reduction in culpability score would increase the calculated
OSG sentence range, the judge could depart downward from
the Guidelines range if she concludes, for example, that the de-
fendant-organization had in place a highly effective compliance
and ethics program at the time of the misconduct that signifi-
cantly changed the characteristics and circumstances of the
offense, or if the defendant cooperated in such a way that a
lesser sentence is warranted. Furthermore, whether an organi-
zation has cooperated meaningfully with the investigation
could be considered as part of the relevant history and charac-
teristics of the defendant, and the judge could grant a down-
ward departure based on this § 3553(a) factor.164
Thus, trial courts would remain able to grant downward
departures from the Guidelines range based on an especially
effective compliance and ethics program or cooperation with the
investigation, but the judge would have to justify such a depar-
ture as based on a "special factor" not specifically mentioned in
the Guidelines.165 As the Supreme Court has stated, if the par-
ticular special factor is absent from the Guidelines, "the court
must, after considering the 'structure and theory of both rele-
vant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a
whole,' decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of the
Guideline's [sic] heartland."166 This is a fairly high bar-the
162. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
163. Id. at 46.
164. See id. at 49-50 & n.6.
165. Koon, 518 U.S. at 96.
166. Id. (citing United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)).
The Court in Koon advised sentencing courts considering departure to analyze
the case along the following lines:
1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guide-
lines' 'heartland' and make of it a special, or unusual, case? 2) Has the
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Court further requires judges to consider the USSC's instruc-
tion that departures based on grounds not included in the
Guidelines should be "highly infrequent,"167 which suggests
that under this framework adherence to the Guidelines will be
the norm, and most organizational defendants will be punished
to the fullest extent of the law.
Critics of this approach may argue that it would be unjust-
ly difficult for a judge to grant a downward departure even if
clearly warranted. This would not be the case. Once a court
sentences a defendant, the decision is given substantial defe-
rence on appeal because it embodies the sentencing court's tra-
ditional exercise of discretion. 168 This is true whether the trial
court issues a sentence within the Guidelines or departs from
them.169 In reviewing a trial court sentencing decision, an ap-
pellate court is not permitted to adopt a presumption of unrea-
sonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines.170 Further-
more, the Supreme Court has made it clear that "extraordinary
circumstances" are not required for a Guidelines departure to
be justified.171 Thus, if the facts of a specific case justify a vari-
ation from the Guidelines range, a judge is permitted to exer-
cise discretion to impose an adjusted sentence, and this deci-
sion is given substantial deference on appeal.
Another argument against this approach is that eliminat-
ing the specific focus on compliance programs and cooperation
would remove any incentive for organizations to pursue these
measures, and thus remove any marginal deterrence and detec-
tion benefits they provide. Again, this would not be the case. As
already stated, judges would still be permitted, and even en-
couraged, to consider compliance and cooperation under the
§ 3553(a) factors. Furthermore, organizations with especially
effective compliance programs may use them as an affirmative
defense.172 At least in the Title VII context, the Supreme Court
Commission forbidden departures based on those features? 3) If not,
has the Commission encouraged departures based on those features?
4) If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on those
features?
Id. at 95 (quoting Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949).
167. Id. at 96.
168. Id. at 98 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989)).
169. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
170. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352-55 (2007).
171. Gall, 552 U.S. at 47.
172. See Rebecca Walker, The Evolution of the Law of Corporate Com-
pliance in the United States: A Brief Overview, in ADVANCED CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS WORKSHOP 2009, supra note 52, at 73, 106-07 (stat-
2010] 1647
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
has held that companies can avoid liability altogether if they
have in place comprehensive compliance policies to prevent the
misconduct. 173 The reasoning of these cases suggests that the
Court would be willing to extend the use of compliance pro-
grams as an affirmative defense in other contexts.1 74 Lastly,
different government institutions encourage, and in some cases
require, the implementation of compliance programs. 75 The
DOJ,176 Securities and Exchange Commission,'" Environmen-
tal Protection Agency,178 Department of Health and Human
Services,179 and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission180
are just a few examples of administrative agencies with sepa-
rate compliance program standards. Companies also have other
incentives to cooperate in investigations, perhaps most impor-
tantly to avoid being seen as criminal in the public eye. Thus,
incentives outside the OSG would remain for companies to
adopt compliance programs and to cooperate with federal pros-
ecutors.
Finally, revising the OSG to make it more difficult for or-
ganizations to be awarded sentence mitigation based on com-
pliance programs and cooperation is consistent with the broad-
er goals of sentencing policy. The recent sentencing policy of
the DOJ has trended toward imposing harsher sentences in
order to show the public that the government is "tough on
crime." From the Guidelines' promulgation in 1991 to 2008, on-
ing that the Supreme Court permits the use of corporate compliance policies
and procedures as an affirmative defense in the sexual harassment context).
173. See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999);
Burlington Indust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808-09 (1998).
174. See Walker, supra note 172, at 106-07.
175. See id.
176. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL: PRINCIPLES
OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9-28.800 (2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opaldocuments/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
177. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Security
Exchange Act of 1934 and Commissioner Statement on the Relationship of
Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
44969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001).
178. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000).
179. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS. & THE AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, CORPORATE RESPON-
SIBILITY AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: A RESOURCE FOR HEALTH CARE
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS (2003), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/
040203CorpRespRsceGuide.pdf.
180. Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement, 123 F.E.R.C. 61,156,
11 62,019-20 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n May 15, 2008).
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ly one of the 262 substantive amendments proposed would have
favored a defendant.181 Every other amendment proposed to the
Guidelines would have resulted in harsher sentences, most of-
ten by increasing an offense level, changing a definition to one
more favorable to the prosecution, adding a sentence enhance-
ment, or adding a base offense level to a new crime. 182 Further
evidence of the DOJ's intent to get tough on crime is revealed
by recent statements and actions of Attorney General Eric
Holder and President Obama. Along with Holder's recent
statements to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, he re-
cently announced the President's Executive Order creating the
Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force in an effort to crack
down on corporate financial crime.183 To that end, President
Obama recently created a task force to investigate and prose-
cute incidences of fraud within health care organizations, after
estimating that such fraud costs American taxpayers about six-
ty billion dollars per year.184 If the Administration aims to ac-
tually increase the deterrence and detection of organizational
crime, it should lobby the USSC to remove the sentence mitiga-
tion provisions from the Guidelines that allow organizations to
escape the full extent of punishment for their crimes.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the publicity surrounding recent incidences
of corporate fraud, the public is pressuring the government to
carefully monitor and harshly punish organizational crime. To
this end, the current OSG sentence mitigation provisions are
counterproductive because they fail to deter and detect corpo-
rate misconduct. Rather, through coercing cooperation and en-
couraging the establishment of facially effective compliance
programs, the Guidelines cause companies to waste resources
181. Susan R. Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ's Attack on Federal
Judicial "Leniency," the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Criminal
Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519, 535 (2009).
182. See id.
183. Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123 (Nov. 17, 2009); Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, President Obama Establishes Interagency Fi-
nancial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-opa-1243.html.
184. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. & U.S. Dep't of Justice, HEAT
Task Force Success: Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action
Team (HEAT), http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/heatsuccess/index.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2010); see also Medicare Fraud: A $60 Billion Crime, CBS
NEWS, Oct. 25, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/23/60minutes/
main5414390.shtml.
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and implement policies that damage both the organization and
its employees. To remedy these deficiencies, the Sentencing
Commission should revise the OSG to eliminate the sentence
mitigation provisions and advise judges to consider sentence
reductions under the § 3553(a) factors, which would permit
greater judicial discretion and decrease unjust sentence mitiga-
tion. In doing so, the Guidelines would further the Justice De-
partment's policy of harshly penalizing organizational crime
and would better protect the public from corporate crime.
